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Throughout history, successive governments in Yemen have 
realized the importance of the media. Consequently, they have 
tightened the grip on the media by imposing a monopoly on 
ownership and by selecting editors-in-chief and other leading 
positions to ensure complete media control. Thus, media have 
functioned as a voice for the government rather than a voice 
for the public. A slight change has occurred since the Yemeni 
unification in 1990 in terms of allowing limited ownership and 
freedom of expression. However, as a result of the long monopoly 
and mismanagement, media in Yemen are facing huge challenges 
at the levels of infrastructure, technology, regulation, freedom of 
expression, training, and professionalism. 
Background
Located in the southernmost portion of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Republic of Yemen is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Arabian 
Sea and Gulf of Aden to the south, the Sultanate of Oman to the east, 
and the Red Sea to the west. In 2019, the population exceeded 29 million, 
with a growth rate estimated at more than 3% per year.
Yemen was for a long time divided in two parts. Before 1962, 
northern Yemen was under the rule of the Zaydi Imamate from 898 to 
1962 until a revolution erupted in September 1962. Southern Yemen was 
under British colonial administration from 1839 to 1967 until another 
revolution began on 14 October 1967 (Varisco, 2017). In 1990, the two 
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Yemens—the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen 
and the Arab Republic of Yemen or North Yemen—unified and became 
one country under the name of the Republic of Yemen.
Yemen is a traditional society that has entered the era of 
modernization only recently, where tribes and clans stand out as active 
in and determinant of social structure (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 14). The tribes 
have had a significant impact on Yemen and its social structure since 
ancient times. Under the modern state structure, the tribes still play a 
pivotal role in Yemen’s political life (Rabe’e, 2012, p. 28). Tribal leaders 
and clans are the basis of state authority in rural areas (Al-Mawla, 2011, 
p. 121).
Most of Yemen remains religiously divided, with the Shi’a Zaydi 
school dominant in the north, and the Sunni Shafi’i School most common 
in the south and along the Red Sea Coast (Varisco, 2017). Sunnis 
represent about 70% of the population and Zaydis about 30%. There 
are also two minorities, one of which is an Ismaili sect that is classified 
as part of the Shi’ites, and the other is Jews, most of whom emigrated 
to Israel in the late 1940s as part of an organized plan to evacuate them 
from Yemen (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 15). Some of the remaining Jews have 
migrated to Israel recently due to conflict and threats, mainly from 
the Houthis. The current state constitution defines Yemen as an Arab, 
Islamic state, and Islamic Shar’ia law is the basis for all legislation. The 
Arabic language is the official and dominant language in society and all 
aspects of life, as well as in the educational system. 
According to the Yemeni Constitution, the political system of Yemen 
is based on political and party pluralism. The authorities are divided 
into three independent entities: the executive authority, represented by 
the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, the legislative 
authority, and the judiciary. However, actual practice reflects that full 
control of the executive lies in the hands of the president, as opposed to 
the other ministers (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 16).
The Yemeni economy in the two Yemens, both before and after 
unification, is a rent-based economy. This type of economy has led to the 
fragility of the state, a lack of power and legitimacy, encouragement of 
non-official groups to rebel against the state, and a lack of stability on the 
economic, political, and social levels (Al-Fakih, 2012, p. 31).
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Many factors have led to enduring political conflict, which has 
been ongoing over the last three decades: corruption, marginalized 
democracy, and a lack of political reform, as well as a failure to embrace 
the collective stance needed to build a modern state. This includes, but 
is not limited to, the secessionist movement in the south and the Houthi 
movement in the north, which culminated after the Arab uprisings in 
2011. One year into the uprising, then-president Ali Abdallah Saleh 
stepped down after more than three decades in power and left a political 
vacuum in the country. Yemen’s political elite acceded to the Gulf 
initiative in November 2011, which established a caretaker transitional 
government. The agreement, which was signed in Riyadh on 23 
November 2011, stipulated a two-year transitional period and created a 
National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as a forum to solve the country’s 
political problems (Schmitz, 2014). The Conference, which lasted for 
almost one year, concluded with agreement on most of the controversial 
and critical issues as well as a future road map. Thus, Yemen was 
referred to as one of the success stories of the Arab uprisings. Yet, within 
months, a rebel group, the Houthis, took over the Amran governorate 
and other important military camps and facilities. Motivated by popular 
frustrations over deteriorating living circumstances and lack of political 
reforms (Clausen, 2015), the Houthi forces and forces loyal to former 
president Saleh took control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a and much of the 
country on 21 September 2014. Consequently, the Yemeni state nearly 
collapsed (Human Rights Watch, 2019).
In March 2015, after Saleh’s successor, President Abed Rabbo 
Mansur Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, appealed for international 
intervention, Saudi Arabia hastily assembled an international coalition 
and launched a military offensive aimed at restoring Hadi’s rule and 
evicting the Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities. Since 
then, the war has caused the deaths of thousands of Yemenis, including 
civilians as well as combatants, and has significantly damaged the 
country’s infrastructure as well as its social fabric (Sharp, 2019).
Historical Developments 
The media in Yemen have been through different historical developments. 
These can be classified into four major phases: 1) the British and Ottoman 
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occupation, 2) revolutionary times and independence, 3) separation 
until 1990, and 4) the period after unification in 1990.
During the first phase, in 1872, the Ottomans introduced the first 
print media to Northern Yemen for official use, the Yemen newsletter, 
which was the first publication in Yemen in the Turkish language. In 1879, 
Sana’a, a weekly newspaper, was published as the first newspaper in the 
Arabian Peninsula in the Turkish language and later on in Arabic and 
Turkish languages (Al-Zain, 1995, pp. 17–32). The Al-Iman newspaper 
was published in 1926 and the Al-Hekma Al-Yamaniya magazine in 1938 
(Al-Zain, 1995, pp. 60–69).
In Southern Yemen, Aden weekly newspaper was the first official 
newspaper, which was published from 1929. Sawt Al-Jazeera Aden was 
published in 1939, followed by other newspapers. The purpose of 
these publications was to clarify Britain’s position on World War II and 
to highlight the victories of the Allied Forces against Germany. These 
publications also aimed to publish news of the colonial administration 
in Aden and its decisions. By 1960, the number of daily and weekly 
newspapers and magazines in Aden had increased to 34 publications 
issued by the government, parties, and syndicates (Mutahar, 2004, p. 
68). These journalistic activities indicate that all competing parties in 
North and South Yemen, including the Imamate, the opposition, and the 
British colonizers, had recognized the importance of print journalism in 
the conflict. 
South Yemen was first introduced to radio broadcasting in 1940 when 
the British occupation authority established a small radio station, Voice 
of the Island, in Aden. This station broadcast on short wave, targeting 
Yemenis and residents of Aden and announcing military victories of 
Britain and the Allied countries against Germany and its Axis allies. 
It also broadcast instructions to citizens on how to protect themselves 
against air strikes during World War II (Basaleem, 2003, p. 65). Radio 
Aden was established in 1954 as the first radio station to provide regular 
services in the region in the morning and evening periods. It broadcast 
programs for six hours per day and 10 hours on weekends (Mutahar, 
2004, pp. 81–82).
In North Yemen, an American delegation came to Sana’a in 1946 to 
discuss with Imam Yahya the oil extraction in Yemen. They brought 
a 13-watt wireless device with them, which they gave to the Imam. 
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This device was then used for radio broadcasting. The radio station 
broadcast its programs every Thursday and Friday for one hour and 15 
minutes only, with content limited to readings from the Holy Qur’an, 
Imam news, religious speeches, and military marches played by copper 
machines (Al-Soswa, 1998, p. 17).
The real birth of the Yemeni radio news came after the revolution of 
26 September 1962, where radio played an important role in defending 
the revolution and the Republican system. After that point, broadcast 
transmission increased to cover the entire day and devoted two hours 
for broadcasting in the English language.
In the South, Aden TV began broadcasting on 11 September 1964, 
during the British occupation of Southern Yemen. The broadcast 
duration ranged from two to four hours daily and covered the city of 
Aden (Al-Fakih, 2000, p. 3). The second phase, during the 1960s, directly 
involved the popular struggle of the Yemeni people. Press publications 
reached a total of 19 newspapers and magazines. Their positions ranged 
from those who supported the armed revolt against the colonizer, to 
those who were pro-occupation, and to others who were in between. 
However, most of these newspapers were pro-revolutionary and 
supported the armed struggle against British colonialism (Mutahar, 
2004, p. 70).
During the third phase, the separation of South Yemen, and after 
the end of British colonialism in 1967 and the establishment of the 
Socialist Party of Yemen, almost all newspapers in the south were 
suspended. During the period from 1970 to 1985, only two newspapers 
were published, Defa’a Al-Sha’ab and Al-Rayah, which was issued by the 
military in 1980. 
In North Yemen after the 1962 revolution, three official newspapers 
appeared: Al-Thawra, Al-Gomhoriah, and Al-Akhbar. Al-Thawra was the 
first newspaper for the newborn republic. Despite the different names of 
those newspapers during that period, their content was almost identical 
in terms of addressing various issues related to the revolution and the 
fledgling republic, as well as questioning the past period in all its forms 
and manifestations. They were operated based on an informally unified 
framework to help in nation-building (Mutahar, 2004, p. 67).
According to the Ministry of Information, the total publications 
in North Yemen reached 46 (daily, weekly, and monthly) during the 
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period from 1962 to 1978. This is considered the phase in which modern 
journalism was established in Yemen.
Aden News Agency was established in 1970 in South Yemen to collect 
and disseminate news, while in North Yemen, Saba’a Yemeni News was 
set up. They later merged into one news agency, the Yemeni News Agency 
(Saba’a), after 1990, which is the main source of news for Yemeni official 
media inside the country, as well as for media institutions abroad. Also, 
Sana’a TV began broadcasting on 24 September 1975, transmitting from 
a studio of 100 square meters with little equipment. 
Yemen General Corporation for Radio & Television was reorganized 
in May 1990 after the reunification through a merger of one corporation 
that was established in Sana’a in 1976 with another that was established 
in Aden in 1986. The headquarters are located in Sana’a. It comprises 
Yemen Satellite Channel and First Channel in Sana’a, Second Channel in 
Aden, Public Radio Program in Sana’a, and Second Radio Program in Aden 
as well as local radio stations in several governorates.
After 1990, Yemeni media have witnessed remarkable developments 
in terms of quantity, quality, and the level of form and content as well 
as the legislative aspect. The number of newspapers and magazines 
were doubled as more licenses were granted. However, only 191 of the 
497 licensed newspapers have continued to be published on regular 
and semi-regular bases (Abdulwase’e, 2009). In addition, television 
transmission via the ArabSat satellite started in 1996.
The widening margin of freedom granted to the media has enabled 
partisan and non-partisan newspapers to appear, allowing all political, 
partisan, and civil society organizations to express themselves through 
print media, including nongovernment newspapers (42), party 
newspapers (22), governmental newspapers (19), nongovernment 
magazines (22), party magazines (3), and 42 governmental and official 
magazines (Basaleem, 2003, pp. 175–81). 
This new free atmosphere and the evolution of satellite television 
broadcasting technology have allowed private television channels to 
appear as well. By the end of 2012, there were 13 television satellite 
channels: four of them are state-run channels and the rest are private. 
Two of the government channels are for general programming, Al-Yemen 
and Aden, and the others are specialized channels, such as Sheba, a youth 
and sports channel, and Al-Iman, a religious channel, both launched in 
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2008. Al-Saeeda TV was the first Yemeni private channel launched from 
Cairo in 2007, and it then moved its operation to Sana’a. In 2009, three 
channels were launched: Suhail, an opposition channel from inside 
the country; Al-Aqeek (Onex), which shut down after one year for 
financial reasons; and Aden Live, an opposition channel from abroad. 
Three more non-governmental channels were launched in 2011. These 
included Yemen Today (partisan channel), A’azal (belonging to one tribe 
leader), and Yemen Shabab, a youth and revolutionary channel as well 
as the Belqees channel, another youth and revolutionary channel owned 
by female Nobel Prize winner Tawakkol Karman. The channel used 
to broadcast from Yemen until 2015, when it was moved to Istanbul 
after being attacked by the Houthis. In 2012, two new channels were 
launched: Al-Maseerah (belonging to the Houthi Movement) and 
Al-Sahat (launched from Beirut in July) (Al-Shami, 2013, pp. 443–51). 
Moreover, two new channels affiliated with Houthis have launched 
and are operating from Sana’a. They are Al-Hawia TV, which officially 
launched on 15 April 2018, and Al-Lahda TV, which launched in July 
2018. In early 2020, Al-Mahriah TV was launched from Istanbul as the 
most recent channel broadcasting from outside the country. 
Political System and Legal Framework
The Yemeni Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression 
to all citizens. According to Article 42, every citizen has the right to 
participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the 
country. The state shall guarantee freedom of thought and expression of 
opinion in speech, writing, and photography within the limits of the law. 
It also guarantees citizens the right to organize themselves in different 
manners. The state shall also guarantee freedom for the political, trade, 
cultural, scientific, and social organizations.
Law No. 25 on the Press and Publication, which was issued in 1990, 
has governed the Yemeni press up to this date. According to Article 33 
of this law, the right to own and publish newspapers and magazines is 
guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens, licensed political parties, 
individuals, public companies, popular organizations, ministries and 
government, as well as corporations. In the chapter on the rights and 
duties of journalists, Article 13 confirms that a “journalist may not be 
204 Arab Media Systems
interrogated on opinions which he has expressed or published, and 
which may not be used to inflict harm on him/her provided what he/
she published is not contrary to the law.” 
Despite the abovementioned constitutional guarantees, Law No. 25 
imposes several restrictions on the freedom of information and allows 
the imprisonment of journalists. Article 103 contains a list of restrictions 
that journalists must take into consideration. This list includes prohibits 
the following:
a) Criticism of the head of state, or attribution to him of declarations or 
pictures unless the declarations were made or the pictures taken during 
a public speech.
b) Anything which leads to the spread of ideas contrary to the principles 
of the Yemeni Revolution, is prejudicial to national unity or distorts the 
image of Yemeni, Arab or Islamic heritage.
c) Anything that undermines public morals or prejudices the dignity of 
individuals or the freedom of the individual by smears and defamation.
Article 104 of the law emphasizes that anyone who violates this “shall 
be subject to a fine not exceeding ten thousand riyals or a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding one year.” Moreover, they shall be tried 
before the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Press and Publications, which 
was founded in 1993. The law also includes other punishments, such as 
the closure of newspapers or suspension of their work, confiscation of 
copies, and the prevention of journalistic practice (Article 19, 2008, p. 6). 
Under this law, several violations against journalists were committed. 
These included, but were not limited to, the imprisonment of journalists, 
seizure of licenses, creation of copies of websites, threats to journalists, 
break-ins at media organizations’ premises, murders and assaults of 
journalists, and confiscation of their equipment. Therefore, this law has 
been subject to much criticism throughout the last years from different 
actors, including individual journalists, the Journalists’ Syndicate, civil 
society organizations, lawyers, and lawmakers. They have called for 
changes or at least amendments to it. In an attempt to regulate online 
journalism, which had started to play a role in influencing public 
opinion, as well as to respond to demands to allow forces other than 
the government to own broadcast channels, in 2010 the Ministry of 
Information proposed a new law for organizing broadcast and online 
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media. This law was however very controversial due to its extreme 
restrictions and conditions for owning and launching media outlets. 
For instance, the proposed new law would require those who wished to 
obtain a license to establish a television channel to pay YER 30 million 
(around USD 135,000 at the time) and YER 20 million (USD 90,000) to 
establish a radio station or online websites. In addition, the same amount 
would have to be paid every two years for a renewal of the license. The 
fees for owning a multimedia service via mobile phone was to be set at 
10 million riyals. However, the political conflicts in the years after the 
law was proposed hindered the process of finalizing and endorsing it 
by parliament. Consequently, Press Law No. 25 from 1990 still governs 
media in Yemen. 
The government’s constant attempts to legislate mass media reflect 
the importance it attributes to the media and its desire to control it. 
This has led it to adopt legal articles that reflect the interests of the 
ruling authority, not those of the press or journalists, and guarantee the 
authority complete control of the media. Consequently, this has led to 
a long conflict between the government, on one hand, and individual 
journalists, the Journalists’ Syndicate, and civil society, including NGOs, 
on the other. It is worth mentioning that in October 2017, the Minister of 
Information under the de facto authority issued a bylaw for the regulation 
of online journalism. 
It is noteworthy that the youth uprising in 2011 had pushed for more 
media freedom, including on the state-run television channels, in terms 
of providing space for different voices, particularly for opposition and 
anti-government voices. Following the uprising, talk show programs on 
the Al-Yemen, Sheba, and Al-Iman channels were dedicated to debating 
about protests, including the reasons that triggered them and their 
consequences. For several weeks, those channels hosted young people 
from the pro- and anti-government groups to openly debate on those 
issues. However, this approach lasted for only a short period of time, and 
those channels eventually returned to presenting a one-sided discourse.
After the Houthis took over Sana’a in September 2014, the media 
landscape in Yemen dramatically changed. They took control of all 
the state-run media, including television channels, radio stations, and 
print and online newspapers as well as Yemeni News Agency (Saba’a) 
and its website: Saba’a Net. They also closed down non-governmental 
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media, including television channels, print and online websites, and 
community radio stations. Moreover, they attacked media premises 
belonging to opposition media organizations, confiscated their property, 
and imprisoned many journalists. According to Human Rights Watch, a 
group of local journalists has been detained in Sana’a for more than three 
years (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Thirty-five journalists have died in 
Yemen since 2011, and eight of them were killed in 2018. In addition, 53 
kidnapping or arrest cases of journalists have been recorded since 2011, 
mostly perpetrated by the Houthis and the related government. The 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the Yemeni Journalists’ 
Syndicate (YJS) reported that 135 cases of press freedom violations were 
registered from January to the end of September 2018. Moreover, the 
Yemeni media have become polarized along political and sectarian lines 
and have been viewed by the warring factions as the enemy (IFJ, 2018).
The Houthis also shut down offices of pan-Arab television channels 
such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as well as other Arab channels, and 
they placed the Internet and mobile phones under censorship and 
surveillance.
The division of the country between the Houthi-controlled areas 
and the Saudi-UAE coalition-controlled areas has created two parallel 
media landscapes in Yemen that reflect the political situation. There 
are two versions of each medium, including Yemen TV, Saba’a Net, 
and the Al-Thawra website. One operates from Riyadh and the other 
from Sana’a, and each of them reflects the position of the individual 
controller. Moreover, some non-governmental television channels have 
migrated abroad. Suhail TV operates from Riyadh, and Yemen Shabab 
from Amman and Istanbul. Belqees TV operates from Istanbul, Al-Sahat 
TV from Beirut, and Yemen Today TV from Cairo. 
The main media victims after the Houthis took control over 
Sana’a were community radio stations. According to Al-Moushaki, 
director of Yemen Times radio station and chair of the Yemeni Network 
for Community Radio, the situation for community radio stations 
deteriorated after 2015 due to economic problems resulting from the 
war. In addition, the premises of many stations were raided, and their 
property was looted. Some others had been suspended, and some 
turned to commercial entertainment models (Al-Reifi, 2019). Around 
mid-2016, community radio stations began to gradually reappear in 
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the Sana’a, Hadramout, and Aden governorates, but with a new focus, 
concentrating on entertainment, social, and religious programs, and 
avoiding political issues. Currently, a few of them deal with political 
issues, but their coverage must be in line with the position of the de facto 
authority in Sana’a. This has enabled them to gain more advertisement 
revenue, especially with the disappearance of most print and online 
newspapers. On the one hand, these stations have represented a new 
venue for advertisers, and a source of profit for owners, on the other 
(Al-Reifi, 2019). 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Despite the many changes in the media landscape in Yemen over the 
last decades, the business models of the media remain almost the 
same. Since the Houthis took over Sana’a in 2014—and as the de facto 
authority—they have directly controlled governmental broadcast, 
print, and online media and financed them from the public treasury 
as a means of propagating their revolutionary discourse and political, 
social, religious, and economic interests. They also monitor all other 
types of media and means of communication. Houthis have blocked 
several websites, especially those belonging to their opponents. Blocked 
websites also include external websites like Aljazeera.net. According 
to a recent report, Yemen has the most significant share of Internet 
shutdowns in the Middle East (KeepetON, 2019). 
An increase in the deployment of network control devices on 
YemenNet, the ISP controlled by Houthi forces, has also been observed 
(Insikt Group, 2019). On the other hand, the internationally recognized 
government has continued to finance copies of the same media operating 
from Riyadh. Moreover, the partisan and non-governmental media 
have continued to operate from abroad, mainly from Istanbul, Amman, 
Riyadh, and Beirut. 
While the main political entities still seem to invest in television, 
printed newspapers have a very limited reach, and are therefore 
not invested in heavily. The print media landscape in Yemen can be 
classified into three basic types of funding. The first is the official one, 
which lacks many conditions of vitality, freedom, and the ability to keep 
abreast of global changes in professionalism and technology. The second 
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is the partisan one, depends on the financial situation of parties in the 
public landscape, and yet their press reflects their miserable situation. 
The third is the nongovernmental press, that is, the press owned by 
private individuals (Abdulwarith, 2009). Al-Akbari (2005) concluded 
in her study that the Yemeni press, whether governmental, partisan, 
or privately-owned, is of minor interest to the public, and its impact 
is weak. The highest number of copies comes from the governmental 
newspaper Al-Thawrah, and this ranged from 5,000—12,000 copies 
during the period from 2013— to 2017. 
Community and private radio stations may be the only exception 
to these long-standing media economic models. They have doubled in 
number since 2011, from less than a handful of radio stations to more 
than 30 stations. Before 2011, the government monopolized FM radio 
signals and granted them only to governmental radio stations. After 
the youth uprising in 2011, this monopoly was broken, and accordingly, 
community radio stations started to appear. Yemen FM radio, which 
belongs to the General People’s Congress (GPC), was the first of these 
stations to be launched (in 2011). 
As a result of the political vacuum that Yemen was experiencing 
at that time, other new FM radio stations were also launched. The 
Yemen Times newspaper, which was the first Yemeni English-language 
newspaper, used this opportunity to launch Radio Yemen Times, which 
was the second station after Yemen FM, followed by Sawt Al-Yemen. The 
period from 2011 to 2014 was significant for community radio stations 
in Yemen. Their discourse was varied and critical. They tackled issues 
ranging from the political to the social. The financial sources of these 
stations were not particularly clear as, similarly to other Yemeni media, 
their financial budgets were not declared. However, advertisements 
may have represented the main source of income. Others, such as Nas 
FM, received support from businesspersons. 
As a result, there are now around eight community radio stations in 
Sana’a, and three in Hadramout. Some of them are general, and others 
are specialized. However, in Aden, there is only one community radio 
station, Lana FM radio (Studies & Economic Media Center, 2018, p. 11).
There are, moreover, 21 private radio stations. Fifteen of them are 
in Sana’a. They are either privately-owned by individuals or supported 
by political parties or religious groups. They include Yemen FM, Iram 
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FM, Yemen Music, Grand FM, Radio Yemen Times, Yemen Voice, and others. 
In Hadramout, there are five private FM radio stations, while in Aden, 
there is only one.
Technological developments—which have reduced the cost of radio 
broadcasting devices, such as transmitters and other equipment—have 
enabled the launch of small FM radio stations covering small, local areas. 
This fact, along with the granting of licenses by the de facto authority in 
Sana’a, has allowed these radio stations to flourish. However, a recent 
study on Yemeni radio stations concluded that the role of these stations 
in Yemen remains weak when it comes to essential issues. It revealed that 
social issues and basic services, such as electricity, water, road networks, 
and security problems, are represented in only a small percentage of 
radio coverage, accounting for just 20%, whereas entertainment, music, 
sports, and politics account for 80% of radio programming (Studies & 
Economic Media Center, 2018, p. 15).
Technology and Infrastructure
Over the past decades, the Yemeni government has exerted significant 
effort to keep up with technological developments, but often lagged 
behind other Arab states. This included shifting to a color television 
system in 1980 and expanding transmission to cover almost 70% of the 
total area of the country, and the whole country by 1996 via the ArabSat 
satellite. In 2001, Internet broadcasting was started through ArabSat 
(Mutahar, 2004, p. 80). However, the technological infrastructure is 
still modest. According to a recent report, the percentage of Internet 
users in Yemen is the lowest in the region, while prices are the most 
expensive in the world (Studies & Economic Media Center, 2018, 
p. 8). Internet users in Yemen were estimated to be more than 7 
million in 2018, which amounted to around 27% of the population. 
However, while television transmission via Internet is very common 
in the neighboring countries, this is not so in Yemen due to its limited 
Internet speed and high prices. This kind of transmission seems still to 
be far off in the future. 
In the era of media convergence, the country is still lagging behind. 
Many print newspapers have an online version as well as accounts on 
social media. However, videos and podcasts are notably still absent from 
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these platforms. Some websites rely on uploaded videos from other 
Arab and international media outlets, like Al-Jazeera, BBC, and YouTube. 
This is due to the slow Internet speed and lack of resources and trained 
persons for producing such materials. This type of convergence has 
deeply affected print media circulation. However, official newspapers 
are still surviving. This is due to indirect financial support from the 
government through subsidy and advertisements. All ministries 
and other governmental institutions are obliged to subscribe to these 
newspapers, as well as to post advertisments in them. 
Mobile users in Yemen amount to around 55% of the total 
population. Four main companies provide mobile services. One is a 
government company, which is Yemen Mobile, and the three others are 
private companies: Sabafon, MTN, and Y Telecom. At this point, 3G is the 
most common network used. Internet users in Yemen have significantly 
increased over the last decades, from 15,000 in 2000 to more than 7.9 
million in 2019. Internet penetration in Yemen is now around 27%.
The number of social media network users in Yemen is growing 
rapidly. They increased by 19% from April 2019 to January 2020. The 
total number of users was 2.5 million in January 2020. Social media 
penetration in Yemen stood at 8.5% in January 2020 (Kemp, 2020). 
Smartphones play a significant role in the growth of social media as the 
majority of users have mobile phones, especially in rural and remote 
areas, and can thus access these platforms. 
Facebook ranks as the top social network in Yemen. More than 8% of 
the population are using this network (NapoleonCat, 2020). According 
to Statcounter GlobalStats (2020), Facebook represents 85% of social 
media users in Yemen, followed by YouTube with 11% and Twitter with 
3%. Other social media networks, such as Instagram and Telegram, are 
used by 1% or less of social media users. 
Challenges
Yemeni media face several challenges, mainly with regard to legal, 
technological, economic and social aspects. In an attempt to keep the 
media under control, the Yemeni government has resisted legislation 
proposals to partially relinquish its control of the media. However, the 
law governing the media was implemented in 1990 and has become 
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seriously outdated. In 2010, the Ministry of Information proposed 
a new law for audiovisual media that raised a lot of controversy. In 
respect to the technological factors, the fast-paced development 
in communications technology and multimedia communication 
represents a main challenge that Yemen in its current state of war 
cannot possibly meet.
Social media play an important role in all aspects of the daily life 
of Yemeni people, particularly young people. This role goes beyond 
facilitating social interaction between people in a very traditional 
and conservative society, such as Yemen, to a full-fledged medium 
of communication by all means. Social media have gained special 
importance since the Houthis’ coup in 2014 that has led to blocking many 
online journalism websites and shutting down several newspapers, radio 
stations, and television channels. In such circumstances, these media 
have become the alternative media for the public to share information, 
publish news, and discuss and express opinions about several issues. 
Activists and journalists in particular heavily utilize social media 
for launching humanitarian relief and political campaigns as well as 
publishing breaking news. Thus, social media have become important 
players for influencing public opinion and enhancing awareness on 
political, social, and cultural levels. 
Outlook
The future of Yemeni media will be determined by the future of the 
country itself after the current war ends. This war has produced many 
changes including a polarized media landscape. New players have 
forced themselves on to the political scene in the north (mainly the 
Houthis), as well as in the south (the Southern Transitional Council). 
Even the long-ruling party, the GPC, which controlled the country 
for more than three decades, has split into two divisions, one inside 
the country and the other abroad. However, the role of the media will 
remain essential for all actors and political players as a driving force 
for social and political changes as well as mobilization. The best media 
model for Yemeni media is to be independent from the ruling authority’s 
control and to become a real public media that serves the interest of 
the people, not the ruling power. From a legislative perspective, in a 
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country like Yemen, the best approach to regulate media is to have 
partnership among all stakeholders, journalists represented by Yemeni 
Journalists’ Syndicate and other syndicates, academia, and experts. 
Joint efforts like this might lead to media laws that would achieve a 
minimum degree of consent on how media should operate in such 
a complex society. From a technology perspective, media in Yemen 
need to create a conducive environment for private investments that 
encourage the private sector to invest in the media industry and work 
in a competitive manner. Finally, freedom is the main pillar of the 
media: without freedom, the country will go nowhere, not only in the 
field of media but also in all aspects of life.
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